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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PRACTICES AFTER
SANDISK V. STMICROELECTRONICS
Michael A. Ladrat & Lillian Ewingtt
Abstract
The Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural device that was
enacted in order to define the rights and legal relations of adverse
parties. The declaratoryjudgment procedural device has been used
by purportedpatent infringers as a sword to adjudicate the validity of
the patents that they are allegedly infringing.Recent decisions in such
cases as SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, and MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., have given practitionersin patent law further insight
into the standards that federal courts will use in granting a
declaratoryjudgment on the validity of a patent in an infringement
case. This note provides a brief overview of the declaratoryjudgment
device, its development, and applicationin hallmark patent cases.
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INTRODUCTION

The Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural device that was
enacted in order to define the rights and legal relations of adverse
parties. The Act states that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought."' The "cases and controversies"
referred to in the Act are the cases and controversies justiciable under
Article III of the Constitution.2
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, plaintiffs have the burden
of showing that an actual controversy exists. 3 In deciding whether this
burden has been met, the court must consider whether there exists an
actual case or controversy over which a federal court may exercise
jurisdiction and whether proceeding without a case or controversy
would result in the court rendering a forbidden advisory opinion.4
However, there is no absolute right to a declaratory judgment: the Act
says that a court may grant one, so the courts 5have discretion to
exercise jurisdiction if a case or controversy exists.
Applied to the patent landscape, the Declaratory Judgment Act
relieves defendants who are engaging in an allegedly infringing
activity of a Hobson's choice: either pursue the allegedly infringing
activity and face damages, or cease an activity that may be a
substantial source of revenue. Generally speaking, the Declaratory
Judgment Act was intended to "fix the problem[s] that arise[] when
the other side does not sue." 6
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Early DeclaratoryJudgment Precedent

Courts have interpreted the requirement of a "case or
controversy" in several key decisions that set precedents for later

1.
2.
(1937).
3.
4.

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95 (1993).
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 360-61 (4th ed. 1998).

5. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
6. Sony Elecs, Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs Ltd., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1798, 1808 (2007)
(citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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courts interpreting the requirement. In 1937, several years after the
Declaratory Judgment Act became law, the Supreme Court in Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth upheld the constitutionality of the
Declaratory Judgment Act and held that a case or controversy under
the Act (and Article III) is a dispute that is "definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,"
that is "real and substantial," and that is capable of "specific relief...
[of a] conclusive character.", 7 Specific relief of a conclusive character
means that a dispute does not require an opinion based on a
"hypothetical state of facts." 8 In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., the court again addressed the case or controversy
requirement, determining that the key question to ask in making such
a determination is "whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 9 Although
these cases outlined key factors to use in determining if a case or
controversy exists, they failed to create a bright line rule.
B. Lear v. Adkins
Years later, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,' 0 the Supreme Court
addressed declaratory judgment actions in the context of patent
licenses, specifically with regard to the remedies a patent holder has
against a licensee who challenges the validity of a patent while
refusing to pay royalties as required under the licensing agreement.
Adkins, an inventor, was hired by Lear, a gyroscope manufacturer, to
develop a gyroscope for aircraft, and entered into a licensing
agreement with Lear in which he promised to grant Lear a license to
"all ideas he might develop 'on a mutually satisfactory royalty
basis.""'1 Adkins improved the gyroscope and Lear then implemented
the improvement into its production process. 12 Adkins subsequently
patented his improvement and sought royalty payments from Lear,
13
which Lear began but later ceased to pay.

7.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).

8.

Id. at 241.
Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).

9.

10.

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).

11.

Id. at 657.

12.

Id. at 653..

13.

Id.
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The Court concluded that requiring Lear to continue paying
royalty payments during the time it was challenging the validity of
Adkins's patent would be "inconsistent with the aims of federal
policy" and would "give the licensor an additional economic
incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to
postpone the day of final judicial reckoning." 14 The Court held that a
licensee is not estopped from challenging the validity of a licensed
patent and is entitled to avoid payment of all royalties accruing after
the patent issued if the licensee can prove invalidity of the patent.' 5
The decision, in effect, gave a patent licensee the right to
terminate a license and challenge the licensed patents. It did not,
however, address whether such a challenge could be mounted without
terminating the license.
C. The FederalCircuit's Two-PartDeclaratoryJudgment
JurisdictionTest
In Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,' 6 the
Federal Circuit clarified the standards that should be used to
determine whether a declaratory judgment action is appropriate.
Arrowhead sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity,
unenforceability, and noninfringement of Ecolochem's patent after
Ecolochem, who was a competitor of Arrowhead in providing water
treatment services, sent letters to Arrowhead's customers asserting
Arrowhead's infringement of an Ecolochem patent on a
deoxygenation process.17
The Arrowhead court created a two-part test that looked to the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs conduct separately. Regarding
the defendant's conduct, the inquiry was whether it created on the part
of the plaintiff a reasonable apprehension that the defendant would
initiate suit if the plaintiff continued the allegedly infringing
activity.' 8 This prong took into account the "totality of circumstances"
in making the determination "when the defendant's conduct,
'9
including its statements, [fell] short of an express charge."'
Regarding the plaintiffs conduct, the inquiry was whether the

14.

Id. at 673.

15.

Id. at 654.

16.

Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

17.

Id. at 733-34.

18.

Id. at 736.

19.

Id. (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed.

Cir. 1987)).
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plaintiff actually produced the allegedly infringing device or prepared
to produce the device. 20 It required the plaintiff
to have a "true interest
21
to be protected by the declaratory judgment.",
The court found that both prongs of the test were satisfied.
Although there was no express charge of infringement, Ecolochem
had nonetheless given Arrowhead a reasonable apprehension of suit
when one considered the totality of circumstances.22 Therefore,
declaratory judgment was proper.23 Ultimately, the Arrowhead court
disapproved of situations that were "[g]uerilla-like, [where] the patent
owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-thecustomer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive environment
of
24
the business community with uncertainty and insecurity.,
D. DeclaratoryJudgments for Licensees and Licensors
In Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 25 the Federal Circuit dealt with
declaratory judgments in the context of a patent license, addressing
whether a licensee who pays royalty payments under a license
agreement can file a declaratory judgment challenging the licensed
patent. Vysis licensed a patent for blood screening technology to GenProbe, with the license agreement providing that Vysis would not sue
Gen-Probe for infringement. 26 Gen-Probe fulfilled its obligations as a
licensee and continued royalty payments, but simultaneously sought a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the
27
patent.
To determine whether a case or controversy existed, the court
used the two-part test outlined in Arrowhead.8 The court determined
that the existence of a license agreement and a patent licensee in good
standing eliminated any reasonable apprehension that the licensee
would be sued by the patent owner for infringement. 29 Finding in
favor of Vysis, the court held that "a licensee must, at a minimum,
stop paying royalties (and thereby materially breach the agreement)
before bringing suit to challenge the validity or scope of the licensed
20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.at737.

23.
24.

Id.at735-37.
Id.at735.

25.

Gen-Probe Inc. v. vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

26.

Id.at 1381.

27.

Id.at 1380.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at1381.
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patent."3 ° The Gen-Probe court clarified the proper declaratory
judgment inquiry in the context of a license, noting that a licensee
"'cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine [of licensee
estoppel] until it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii)
provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of
royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be
invalid."' '3 1 Otherwise, the "licensor would bear all the risk, while the
licensee would benefit from the license's effective cap on damages or
royalties in the event its challenge to the patent's scope or validity
32
fails."
E. Refining the Two-PartDeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction
Test
In Teva Pharmaceuticals. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 3 the court
refined the two-part declaratory judgment jurisdiction test. Teva, a
manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals, brought an action against
the drug manufacturer Pfizer, which held a patent for a new
crystalline form of sertraline hydrochloride, as well as a method for
its preparation. 34 Teva filed a Hatch-Waxman "paragraph IV
certification" 35 with the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),
stating that its generic drug did not infringe Pfizer's patent or that,
alternatively, the patent was invalid.36 During the 45 days allotted to
Pfizer by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 37 during which it could
sue Teva for infringement and Teva could not file a declaratory
judgment, Pfizer failed to take action.38 When the 45 days were
completed, Teva sought a declaratory judgment.39
30.

Id.

31.

Id. (quoting Studiengesellschaft Kohle M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568

(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
32. Id. at 1382.
33.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
34.

Id. at 1326-27.

35.
A "paragraph IV certification" refers to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), which
states that an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") applicant must make one of four
certifications with respect to each patent that claims the drug for which it is seeking approval.
The fourth certification ("paragraph IV certification") asserts that the patent is invalid or will not
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug for which the ANDA is
submitted.
36. Teva, 395 F.3d at 1327.
37. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments are part of the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35 U.S.C.).
38. Teva, 395 F.3d at 1327.
39. Id.
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In its analysis, the court refined the first prong of the two-part
test to require reasonable apprehension of an imminent suit. The
"requirement of imminence reflect[ed] the Article III mandate that the
injury in fact be 'concrete' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."' 40 With regard to the second prong of the test, the court
interpreted the requirement to be "present activity by the declaratory
judgment plaintiff which could constitute infringement, or concrete
steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity. 4' 1 The court
ultimately found that Teva failed to satisfy the first prong of the test
because "Teva virtually concede[d] that Pfizer [would] not bring
immediate suit for infringement of the ...patent. '' 42 As a result, there
was no case or controversy for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
F.

The New DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction Test:
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
1.

Facts

In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.43 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a licensee's own acts of making
royalty payments so that there would be no risk the patentee will seek
to enjoin a licensee's sales, evidenced a lack of case or controversy
under Article III, and thus prevented the patentee from seeking a
declaratory judgment.44 Genentech, a drug manufacturer, entered into
a license agreement with MedImmune, a competitor in the industry,
which covered a pending patent application that matured into a patent
belonging to Genentech.45 When the patent issued, Genentech sent a
letter to MedImmune claiming that the drug they manufactured was
covered by its patent and that Medlmmune owed royalties under the
prior licensing agreement. 46 MedImmune asserted that no royalties
were due because the patent was invalid and unenforceable, but
considered the letter a threat to pursue infringement litigation and to
terminate the license agreement if MedImmune did not pay

40.
(1998)).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1333 (quoting Steel Co., v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1333.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
Id. at 767
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 768.
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royalties.47 MedImmune paid the royalties under protest and filed a
declaratory judgment action.48
2.

Analysis

The Court ultimately found that an Article III case or
controversy requirement does not require a licensee to breach a
license agreement prior to seeking a declaratory judgment of patent
invalidity.49 In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its
precedent in Altvater v. Freeman, declaring:
[T]he requirements of [a] case or controversy are met where
payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is
made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction
preserves the right to
recover the sums paid or to challenge the
50
legality of the claim.
Prior to Altvater, the coercion principle was applied to governmental
actions only. 5' The Court noted that the coercion in Altvater was
private, not governmental, and, therefore, the analysis of Altvater
could be applied to Medlmmune
As it turns out, the most important part of the MedImmune
decision is to be found in the dicta in footnote eleven rather than in
the actual holding. Footnote eleven effectively invalidates the
reasonable apprehension test used by the Federal Circuit for
determining whether a case or controversy exists under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. 53 The Court in MedImmune found that
the reasonable apprehension test used in Teva, Gen-Probe and others
conflicted with Altvater, Maryland Casualty Co., Aetna, and Cardinal

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 777.

50.
Id. at 773 (citing Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943) (emphasis added).
The Court further noted that "the dilemma posed by that coercion-putting the challenger to the
choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution-is 'a dilemma that it was the very
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate."' Id.

51.
See, e.g., Terrace v. Thomson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (holding that where the State
threatened plaintiff with forfeiture of his farm if he entered into a violative lease there was not a
requirement to initiate the lease in order to test the validity of the law). The MedImmune court
explained that "where threatened action by government is concerned, [it] does not require a

plaintiff to challenge the basis for the threat ... [and] the plaintiff's own action (or inaction) in
failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not
eliminate Article Ill jurisdiction." Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772.
52.

Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774.

53.

Id. at 774.
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Chemical Co. 54 The test conflicted with Aetna precedent, in which a
case or controversy existed "even though the very reason the insurer
sought declaratory relief was that the insured had given no indication
that he would file suit." 55 It also conflicted with the test applied in
Maryland Casualty, in which a case or controversy existed even
though a collision-victim could not have sued the declaratory
judgment plaintiff-insurer without first obtaining a judgment against
the insured.5 0 Finally, it conflicted with the holding in Cardinal
Chemical Co., in which a case or controversy existed even though the
court found that there was no infringement and no apprehension of
suit, because lack of such apprehension "does
not moot a declaratory
5 T
judgment counterclaim of patent invalidity."
The significance of footnote eleven lay in its clear signal that the
Supreme
Court viewed the Federal
Circuit's "reasonable
apprehension of suit" test as contrary to law in all contexts, not just in
a licensor-licensee dispute as presented in Medimmune.
3.

Implications of the Decision

The Court created no bright line test for determining whether a
case or controversy exists, but emphasized that in making such a
determination a court should consider the totality of circumstances.
The Court quoted Aetna and concluded that Article III requires a
dispute to be "'definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests'; and that it be 'real and
substantial' and 'admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."' 5 8 Importantly,
Article III does not require a plaintiff to risk its livelihood in order to
qualify as having a justiciable case or controversy: "[t]he rule that a
plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk
treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before
seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no

54.

Id. n. 1.

55.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.1l; See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 239 (1937).
56.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.1 1; See also Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
57.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n. I1;See also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l
Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993).
58.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 240-41 (1937).
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support in Article I1."59 In summary, the declaratory judgment test
presented by the Court in MedImmune eliminated the reasonable
apprehension of suit element from the traditional case or controversy
test for declaratory judgments, but it presented no bright line
replacement test.
The impact of the MedImmune decision, particularly the dicta in
footnote eleven, has been widely felt. The Court concluded, following
its decision in Lear years before, that a patent licensee need not
breach an underlying license agreement in order to challenge the
validity of a patent. 60 The Court applied this reasoning to
MedImmune and found that a licensee can challenge a licensed patent
by filing a declaratory judgment action against the licensor, even
without breaching the underlying license agreement. 6 1 The effect of
this finding is to enlarge the class of potential plaintiffs who can
qualify as having a justiciable case or controversy for the purposes of
the Declaratory Judgment Act. However, the presence of a case or
controversy is still based on an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances. 62 The decision may be interpreted as a continuation of
the Supreme Court's hostility to binding a licensee's hands, which
started with the Lear court.
III. APPLICATION OF THE NEW DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TEST:
SANDISK Copy. v. STMCROELECTRONICS, INC.

A.

Facts

In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,63 the court relied
on the precedent of MedImmune and applied the revised declaratory
judgment jurisdiction test, in which the reasonable apprehension
element was effectively eliminated. STMicroelectronics ("ST"), a
company in the business of flash memory storage devices, requested a
meeting with SanDisk Corporation ("SanDisk"), a competitor in the
industry, to discuss a cross-licensing agreement for fourteen patents
owned by ST that ST indicated might "be of interest" to SanDisk.64 At

59.
60.
61.

Id. at 775.
Id. at 777.
Id.

62.

Id. at 771.

63.
SanDisk Corp. v.
[herinafter Sandisk I1].

STMicroelectronics,

Inc., 480

F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

64.
Id. at 1374 (citing SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 04-CV-04379, slip
op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Sandisk 1.])
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the meeting, ST presented infringement analyses of the patents,
"mapp[ing] the elements of each of the allegedly infringed claims to
the aspects of the accused SanDisk products alleged to practice the
elements., 65 The experts at the meeting "liberally referred to
SanDisk's (alleged) infringement of [ST's] products. 66 However, at
the meeting ST's vice president of intellectual property and licensing,
Lisa Jorgensen, declared that "ST has absolutely no plan whatsoever
to sue SanDisk. 6 7 After failed attempts to schedule another
negotiation meeting with ST, SanDisk filed a lawsuit against ST,
alleging infringement of one of its patents and seeking a declaratory
ST
judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the fourteen 68
patents that were discussed during the cross-licensing negotiations.
B. ProceduralHistory
ST filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, maintaining there was no actual controversy as required
by Article 111.69 The District Court granted ST's motion to dismiss,
finding that SanDisk did not have an objectively reasonable
apprehension of suit, even if it subjectively believed ST might bring
an infringement suit. 70 The court found that the infringement analyses
lacked the requisite "'express charges [of infringement] carrying with
them the threat of enforcement ' ' 71 and that there could be no
objective basis for an apprehension of suit when ST expressly stated
that it did not intend to sue SanDisk.72 These considerations led the
court to conclude that the totality of circumstances did not create an
actual controversy. The case was appealed to the Federal Circuit, 73 but
before the Federal Circuit issued its decision, MedImmune was
decided 7 4 As a result, the court relied on Medlmmune in reaching its
decision.7 5
65.

Id. at 1375 (quoting SanDisk I, slip op. at 5).

66.

Id.(quoting SanDisk I, slip op. at 5-6).

67.

Id. at 1376 (quoting SanDisk I, slip op. at 6).

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.

Id. See SanDisk 1,slip op. at 14.

71.

Id. at 1377 (quoting SanDiskl, slip op. at 14-15).

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.
SanDisk was argued before the Federal Circuit on January 13, 2006. The Supreme
Court issued its MedImmune decision on January 9, 2007. The Federal Circuit issued its
SanDisk decision on March 26, 2007.

75. The parties made their arguments prior to the issuing of the decision in MedImmune
and therefore relied on pre-Medlmmune precedent. SanDisk relied on Arrowhead, arguing that

196
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C. Analysis
On review, the Federal Circuit held:
[W]here a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where
that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused
activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will
arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by
engaging
in the identified activity before a declaration of its legal
76
rights.
The decision solidified the MedImmune rejection, in footnote
eleven, of the reasonable apprehension test and expanded its
application to the context of parties with no legal relationship. 7
Unfortunately, the SanDisk court left the breadth of its holding
undeclared: "We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the
principles of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the facts and
circumstances of each case."7 8
The case or controversy test used by the SanDisk court was the
revised test mandated by MedImmune, but applied outside the context
of a licensor-licensee relationship. The revised test, although it
relaxes the requirements a potential plaintiff must meet in order to
show a case or controversy, still requires some activity by the
patentee. The SanDisk court interpreted the test to require the
patentee to assert his or her rights based on some ongoing or planned
activity, so that "declaratory judgment jurisdiction generally will not
arise merely on the basis that a party learns of the existence of a
patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose a risk
of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee., 79 The
test also requires a response by the potential plaintiff consisting of an
asserted right to engage in the accused activity without a license.8 °
SanDisk had an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit based on the totality of
circumstances because of ST's infringement analysis presentation and the fact that licensing
negotiations had ceased at the time SanDisk filed its declaratory judgment action. ST relied on
cases interpreting Arrowhead, arguing that the "bare mention of infringement, particularly
during license negotiations, is not sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Arrowhead." ST
argued that the totality of circumstances did not show that ST's conduct created a case or
controversy. Id. at 1377.
76.

SanDisk I1,
480 F.3d. at 1381.

77.

The court concluded: "[tihe Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune represents a

rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit test." Id. at 1380.
78. Id.at 1381.
79.

Id. at 1380-81.

80.

Id. at 1381.
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Interpreting the MedImmune test and applying it to the facts in
SanDisk, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court had
improperly granted dismissal. 81 The court looked to the defendant
ST's conduct in its totality, rather than focusing on whether the
conduct had created a reasonable apprehension of suit. ST's conduct
met the revised test's threshold because ST had asserted its rights by
seeking a royalty for its patents. 82 Furthermore, Jorgenson's promise
not to sue did not "moot the actual controversy created by its acts."83
Plaintiff SanDisk's activity satisfied the requirements of the revised
test because it responded by continuing its allegedly infringing
activity while asserting its noninfringement. 84 The court found that a
case or controversy existed, giving rise to declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, and that SanDisk need not "'bet the farm,' so to speak,
and risk a suit for infringement by. .. continuing the [allegedly
85
infringing] activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.,
IV. IMPACT OF THE SANDISK DECISION

A.

PracticalImpact of SanDisk Holding on Declaratory
Judgment Analysis

After SanDisk, it became clear that footnote eleven in
MedImmune would be followed as precedent and that the reasonable
apprehension of suit test was effectively eliminated. Doubt was
removed about the breadth of the Medlmmune holding: it had a broad
application. 86 The holding formally applied the Medlmmune case or

81.
82.

Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1382.

83.

Id. at 1383. The court did not go into detail addressing this prong of the case or

controversy test, instead focusing on the reasonable apprehension element of the first prong: "In
this case, we address only the first prong of this court's two-part test. There is no dispute that the
second prong is met." Id. at 1380 n.2.
84.
The court noted that "SanDisk ... [had] maintained that it could proceed in its
conduct without the payment of royalties to ST." Id. at 1382.

85.

Id.

86.
The amicus brief of Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd. ("Guardian"), in support of
STMicroelectronics, argued that MedImmune should be confined to the licensor-licensee

scenario. Brief for Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd. as Amici Curiae

Supporting

Respondents, SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No.

05-1300). Guardian argued that the reasonable apprehension test was not invalidated in
Medlmmune if the holding is construed narrowly:
Apart from the Supreme Court's specific holding that the payment of license
royalties does not eliminate the controversy created by a patentee's explicit threat
to sue for patent infringement, [the Federal Circuit's] complete two-part
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controversy test, for the first time, to a situation where the parties did
not have a legal relationship. However, the outer reach of the holding
was left undeclared. 7
The broad holding has important implications for patentees.
After SanDisk, an Article III case or controversy exists any time a
patentee puts a declaratory judgment plaintiff in a "position of either
pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning" activity it asserts it
has right to do.8 8 There is no longer a safe haven for a patentee to
offer a license and expressly state that there is no intent to sue for
infringement.8 9 The patentee may still be subject to a declaratory
judgment action. The potential licensee, who has more leverage after
SanDisk, can respond with "put up or shut up," 90 and virtually any
response by the patentee to the potential licensee, other than a
disavowal of patent coverage, will expose the patentee to a potential
declaratory judgment action. 91 The dissent in SanDisk correctly
asserted that there is potentially no "stopping point short of allowing
declaratory judgment actions in virtually any case in which the
elects to dispute the
recipient of an invitation to take a patent license
92
patentee."
the
sue
to
then
and
license
a
need for
B. Effects on DeclaratoryJudgments Thus Far
An expansion of the class of potential declaratory judgment
plaintiffs has not, somewhat surprisingly, coincided with an actual
increase in the number of filings. To the contrary, as of July of 2007,
seven months after the MedImmune decision and four months after
jurisdiction test is unaffected by MedImmune and is fully consistent with the
Court's other declaratory judgment precedents.
Id. at 2-3.
87. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
88. Id.
89. Id.at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Bryson elucidates the effect of the new test with the following illustration:
91.
[Elven a representation by the patentee that it does not propose to file suit against
the prospective licensee will not suffice to avoid the risk that the patentee will
face a declaratory judgment action. And if there is any uncertainty on that score,
all the prospective licensee has to do in order to dispel any doubt is to inquire of
the patentee whether the patentee believes its activities are within the scope of the
patent. If the patentee says "no," it will have made a damaging admission that
will make it very hard ever to litigate the issue, and thus will effectively end its
licensing efforts. If it says "yes" or equivocates, it will have satisfied the court's
test and will have set itself up for a declaratory judgment lawsuit.
Id. at 1384-85.
92. Id.
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the SanDisk decision, there has been little change in the number of
declaratory judgment cases. Nationwide, the number of patent
declaratory judgment filings is actually lower post-Medlmmune, with
144 filings in the seven months pre-MedImmune and 124 filings in
the seven months post-MedImmune.93 The total number of patent case
filings for the same period pre- and post-Medlmmune (1,599 vs.
1,478) indicate that the relatively steady state of declaratory judgment
the result of an increase in patentees "suing first and
filings is not 94
settling later."
There are several possible reasons for the apparently limited
practical effect of the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions. The first is
that initiating litigation is a serious decision. The time, cost, and
inherent risks of litigation make it a large undertaking with no
concrete assurance of achieving the desired outcome. If parties prefer
a licensing arrangement, then they are likely to explore that option
first and seek resolution rather than pursue litigation. Parties
otherwise interested in licensing agreements are likely to sue first
only when they view litigation as inevitable. The second possible
reason for the limited practical effect is that if there is a dispute with
little hope for an agreement between the parties, then the prospective
defendant would likely have been able to file a successful declaratory
judgment action pre-Medimmune. Therefore, the changed legal
situation would not spark a change in the number of declaratory
judgment actions.
C. Illustrative Cases: Application of the SanDisk Rationale
1. Benitec Australia Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.
a. Facts
In Benitec Australia Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,95 the court used the
reasoning of MedImmune, particularly footnote eleven, and SanDisk
in reaching its decision on whether a case or controversy existed for
the purposes of a declaratory judgment action. Specifically, the issue
focused on whether the court possessed -declaratory judgment
93.
These numbers were derived by the authors from the filing information contained in
the Federal Courts' nationwide PACER database. The authors performed a manual search
through the PACER system, searching first under the criteria of all "Patent/Declaratory
Judgment" actions, and then under a "Patent" only criterion from information supplied on case
cover sheets.
94. Id.
95. Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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jurisdiction over Nucleonics' counterclaims seeking declarations of
invalidity and unenforceability of Benitec's U.S. Patent No.
6,573,099 ("the '099 patent"), which covers
interference RNA
96
(RNAi) gene silencing for use in gene therapy.
Benitec sued Nucleonics for infringement of Benitec's '099
patent, after which Nucleonics responded with a motion to dismiss
Benitec's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.9 7
Nucleonics argued that Benitec "shot before there [was] even a
target" since the allegedly infringing activity would take place years
in the future and depended on the outcome of clinical trials. 98 The
court denied Nucleonic's motion for dismissal, but without
prejudice. 99 Nucleonics proceeded to file a request with the USPTO
for reexamination of the '099 patent.100 Benitec then moved the court
to dismiss its complaint without prejudice on the basis of the decision
in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., in which the court
interpreted broadly a pharmaceutical research exemption, arguing that
there was "no presently viable infringement claim against
Nucleonics."' 0 The district court granted Benitec's motion to dismiss
its complaint without prejudice, in which Benetic promised "not to
sue Nucleonics for patent infringement arising from activities and/or
products occurring on or before the date dismissal was entered in this
action," and dismissed Nucleonics' counterclaim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 10 2 Nucleonics appealed the dismissal
of its
03
declaratory judgment counterclaims against Benitec.
b. Analysis
The appeals court affirmed the District Court's dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the reasoning of
Medlmmune's footnote eleven and SanDisk. 10 4 The court rejected

96.

Id. at 1342-43.

97. Id. at 1342
98. Id.
99. The court dismissed, without prejudice, for reconsideration depending on the outcome
of the Supreme Court's review of Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v, Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Id.
100. Id. at 1342.
101.
Id. at 1342-43 (citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193
(2005)) (stating that the Merck decision "read[] expansively the pharmaceutical research
exception of§ 27 1(e)(1)").
102. Id. at 1343.
103.
Id.
104. The court stated:
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imminence of suit as a key factor in determining whether there was
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, relying instead on the finding that
Nucleonics had failed to show a case or controversy of "sufficient
immediacy
and reality"
to support declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 10 5 The court elucidated the requirement that the party
seeking a declaratory judgment has the burden of proof to establish
that "such jurisdiction existed at the time the claim for declaratory
relief was filed and that it has continued since, 10 6 and "at all stages of
review, not merely at the time the complaint [was] filed."' 0 7 If a party
is sued for infringement, then there is necessarily a case or
controversy at the time of filing, which continues "absent further
information" to the contrary. 10 8 However, the burden remains on the
party seeking the declaratory judgment to show that a controversy still
exists.'0 9 When a controversy is eliminated, the subject matter
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action is also eliminated.
The Benitec court found that declaratory judgment jurisdiction
existed at the time Nucleonics filed its counterclaims because
Benitec's patent infringement claims were still pending." l0 The main
issue was whether declaratory judgment jurisdiction still existed after
Benitec dismissed its complaint against Nucleonics."' With regard to
Nucleonics's human application of its RNAi technology, the filing of
a New Drug Application ("NDA") with the FDA was not expected
until 2010 at the earliest, and "[t]he fact that Nucleonics may file an
NDA in a few years does not provide the immediacy and reality
required for a declaratory judgment."'"1 2 Benitec's promise not to sue
over the human RNAi technology was distinguished from the promise
In view of [the decision in Medlmmune], particularly footnote II expressing
disapproval of our previously used "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit"

test for determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction, we requested further
briefing. The court has considered that briefing and is now also informed by this
court's recent decisions in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis
PharmaceuticalsCorp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics NV, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), both of which involve
the application of standards set forth in Medlmmune for determining declaratory
judgment jurisdiction.
Id. at 1343.
105. Id. at 1349 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007).
106. Id. at 1344 (citing, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10 (1974)).
107. Id. at 1345 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459n.10).
108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.

Id. at 1345-46.

112.

Id. at 1346.
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made by ST in SanDisk, which did not preclude declaratoryjudgment
jurisdiction,by the fact that ST had made a statement that it intended
not to sue, while Benitec made a statement that it would not sue.
Benitec's withdrawal of its complaint, coupled with its promise not to
sue, led the court to conclude that declaratory judgment jurisdiction
was lacking on the claims relating to the human RNAi technology.13
As for Nucleonics's animal RNAi technology, which was still in
the development stage, the court found that declaratory judgment
jurisdiction was lacking because Nucleonics did not qualify at present
' 14
as one who "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells""
an allegedly infringing product. 15 The discussions related to animal
RNAi technology failed to meet the immediacy and reality
requirements of MedImmune, as did future plans that did not yet
constitute any sort of infringing activity"16
c.

Impact

The holding of the Benitec court clarifies that future controversy
is not enough to create jurisdiction because it is too speculative:
"[t]here is currently, however, no 'substantial controversy, between
[Benitec and Nucleonic], of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment' ... [a]nd there may
never be." ' 1 7 Taken as a whole, the Benitec court followed
MedImmune precedent and rejected the historical imminence of suit
test in favor of the definite and concrete dispute requirement used in
Medlmmune. The implication is that declaratory judgment jurisdiction
is limited because patentees can eliminate a case or controversy by
dismissing an original infringement action and promising not to sue

113.

Id. at 1349.

114.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).

115.

Benitec, 495 F.3d at 1348.

116.

Id. at 1348-49. The future plans relating to animal RNAi technology failed to meet

the requirements for declaratory judgment jurisdiction because of three reasons: (1)"Nucleonics
merely 'expect[ed]' to begin work 'shortly"' and its "only steps toward potentially-infringing
animal research [were] discussions with an unnamed potential customer and execution of an
undescribed confidentiality agreement." Id. at 1349. (2) Nucleonics "provided insufficient
information for a court to assess whether Nucleonic's possible future animal work would be
infringing or not" and "one cannot tell if Nucleonics intends to undertake activity that would fall
within [the research] exception or would otherwise be infringing. Id. (3) "Benitec has never
challenged use of the technology in testing in animals for animal use" so that "there is no
evidence of a justiciable controversy between Benitec and Nucleonics over Nucleonics's
vaguely defined potential expansion to animal husbandry and veterinary products." Id.
117.

Id. at 1349 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007)

(emphasis added).
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over existing products,
without showing that the controversy will not
11 8
recur in the future.
2.

Sony Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Guardian Media
Technologies, Ltd.
a.

Facts

In Sony Electronics, Inc. et al. v. GuardianMedia Technologies,
Ltd.,
the court again applied MedImmune precedent and SanDisk
reasoning in determining whether declaratory judgment jurisdiction
existed. Sony et al. ("Sony") sued Guardian, seeking a declaratory
judgment that two patents owned by Guardian (U.S. Patent Nos.
4,930,158 ("the '158 patent"') and 4,930,160 ("the '160 patent"))
were invalid, not infringed, and unenforceable due to laches and
equitable estoppel.120 The patents at issue "describe[d] a system in
which users [could] selectively block the viewing or playing of
21
programs that have particular program classification codes."',
119

Specifically, the '160 patent described "methods and apparatuses for
blocking the viewing of certain television programs"' 122 and the '158
patent described "methods and apparatuses for blocking the playing
123
of certain programs recorded on a videotape or other medium."'
Sony sold "V-Chip" technology that allegedly infringed these patents
24
and the other appellants sold similar technology.
Guardian sent letters to each of the plaintiffs asserting
infringement of the '160 and '158 patents and proposing a licensing
agreement. 125 The plaintiffs refused the offer of negotiations and each
sought a declaratory judgment.' 26 Guardian filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiffs filed a joint
motion to stay the district court cases pending reexamination of the
'158 and '160 patents.127 The district court granted Guardian's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that there

118.
Id.at 1355 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
119.
Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., No. 06-1363, 2007 WL 5836999, at
*1271 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 3, 2007).
120.

Id. at*1273.

121.

Id.

122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Id. at*1274.

125.

Id. at*1275,*1276,*1279

126.

Id. at*1276, *1279, *1281.

127.

Id.at*1281.
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was no actual controversy as required under Article III because there
was no explicit threat and none of Guardian's actions amounted to an
"implicit threat of immediate
litigation." 128 The plaintiffs appealed the
129
dismissal.
district court's
b. Analysis
The Federal Circuit found that the district court had erred in
30
dismissing the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court analyzed the facts relating to each plaintiff, but the analysis
was similar for each, and Sony is particularly illustrative. With regard
to Sony, the court looked to the totality of circumstances, finding that
Sony and Guardian had taken "adverse positions regarding whether
Sony's sale of products ... infringed any valid claims of the '158 and
'160 patents"1 31 and that the dispute was not based on a hypothetical
set of facts.1 32 Guardian's willingness to negotiate a "business
resolution" and the potential characterization of the parties'
interactions as negotiations did not negate declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 33 Importantly, the lower court was guided to "take into
account that the '158 and '160 patents [were] currently undergoing
reexamination at the request of appellants, and that appellants ha[d]
requested a 34
stay pending the outcome of the reexamination
proceedings."'

C. Impact

There are several implications of the Sony decision. The decision
makes it clear that a party cannot avoid declaratory judgment
jurisdiction by denying hostile intent and expressing a desire to
achieve a "business resolution." The import of the decision also lies
with the court's thinly veiled hint to the lower courts to take into
128. Id. (quoting Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., No. 05-CV-1777-B,
slip op. at 16 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006)).
129.

Id.

130.

Id. at *1286.

131.

Id. at *1285.

132.

Id. The Court explained that "Guardian has explicitly identified the patents it believes

that Sony infringes, the relevant claims of those patents, and the relevant Sony products that it
alleges infringe those patents. Sony has identified the specific prior art references that it believes

render the asserted claims invalid." Id.
133.

Id. at * 1286. The Court references SanDisk., where "a patentee's apparent continued

willingness to engage in licensing negotiations [did] not prevent a plaintiff from maintaining a
declaratory judgment suit." Id. (citing SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d
1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
134.

Id. at *1289.
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account the fact that the patents were under reexamination by the
USPTO. After the Sony decision, a pending re-examination by the
USPTO may be a reason for courts to decline declaratory judgment
jurisdiction and a new strategic maneuver for parties who wish to
avoid a declaratory judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION

SanDisk removes any doubt that the removal of the reasonable
apprehension of suit test applies to all cases, including patent cases.
However, the expansion of the class of cases to which declaratory
judgment jurisdiction now applies has not changed the seriousness of
the decision to bring one, nor has it impacted the risks and rewards.
Thus Medlmmune and SanDisk have had a limited effect: the
frequency of declaratory judgments up to this point has not changed,
only the rationale for accepting or denying them. After MedImmune
and SanDisk, courts will look to the totality of circumstances in
determining whether a case or controversy exists for the purpose of a
declaratory judgment action. Courts will especially consider the metes
and bounds of the dispute and the activities of the parties. In addition,
they will consider judicial economy, as evidenced by the Sony
decision, and the immediacy of the controversy, as evidenced by
Benitec. Withdrawing a complaint or submitting a request to the
USPTO for patent reexamination may be a means to avoid declaratory
judgment jurisdiction after SanDisk. However, courts will not
consider whether defendant's conduct created on the part of plaintiff a
reasonable apprehension that the defendant would initiate suit if the
plaintiff continued the allegedly infringing activity.

*

*

*

